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of alcohol. The aforementioned witnesses
characterized Houck as uncooperative,
combative, hostile, and belligerent.
Another paramedic stated that Houck "appeared to be intoxicated - he smelled of
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, all he could
do was moan, 'he could not converse.'" Id.
In short, it was the considered opinion of
those in contact with Houck after the accident that Houck consumed alcohol to the
extent that his normal coordination, faculties, and physical and mental abilities were
substantially and materially impaired. Id.
The trial judge, in consideration of the
foregoing evidence, submitted the case to
the jury on the question of the "proximate
cause of this accident ... " and "the compensatory damage aspects," but had "a
serious problem sending it on punitive
damages." The trial judge determined that,
as a matter of law, neither Lockett, nor
Houck exhibited such a wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would permit him to submit the question of punitive
damages to the jury. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at
1121.
The court of appeals, then considered
the requisite conditions for the imposition
of punitive damages:"

appeals did hold, however, that a finding
by the jury that Houck was intoxicated
would have been sufficient to infer that he
exhibited a wanton or reckless disregard
for human life, thus justifying an award of
punitive damages. The facts and circumstances surrounding Houck's behavior
were sufficient to indicate outrageous conduct. The lower court erred, therefore, in
keeping from the jury the issued of
punitive damages. Id.
The holding in Lockett v. Nast reinforces
legislation responding to the public sentiment for more stringent penalties against
those who operate motor vehicles while
intoxicated. Thus, punitive awards will be
made available to an increasing number of
drunk driving victims. The court warned,
however, that "[t]he step we take today recognizing that one who drinks to the
point of becoming intoxicated and then
undertakes the operation of a motor vehicle may be found to have had a wanton disregard for human life - is not an
invitation to claim punitive damages in
any case where negligence and drinking
can be shown." Id. at 370, 539 A.2d at 1127
(emphasis added).

-Jules R. Bricker
We think that in civil automobile accident cases involving a drinking driver
whether the driver had a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life, in
the operation of an automobile, is to
be tested by a sliding scale. As the
degree of impairment by the voluntary
consumption of alcohol increases, the
need for other aggravating circumstances lessens, and visa versa.

Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. The court
opined that the act of outrageous driving,
as well as the act of driving after the point
of voluntary intoxication, permitted the
inference that the driver did not care
whether he killed or injured others. The
court clarified that "[w ]hat must not be
forgotten is that the discretion to award
punitive damages becomes available only
when the combination of relevant facts
demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that the driver had a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life." Id. at
363, 539 A.2d at 1123. Thus, individuals
who drive negligently, but not outrageously, and who have not consumed alcohol
beyond the point of intoxication are not
subject to punitive damages. Id.
The court concluded that regarding
Lockett's case, the judge did not err in
withholding the issue of punitive damages
from the jury since, as a matter of law, the
facts were not sufficient to indicate that
she was legally intoxicated. The court of

Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership: JUDICIARY'S
ABILITY TO A WARD ATTORNEY'S

FEES LIMITED
In Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth
Assocs. 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175
(1988) the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that the Circuit Court for
Carroll County abused its discretion by
imposing attorney's fees against the Legal
Aid Bureau under Md. Rule 1-341. The
court reasoned that Legal Aid produced
factual issues for the consideration of the
fact-finder and that the judge was clearly
erroneous in finding that Legal Aid was
motivated by "bad faith" and a "lack of
substantial justification." As a result, the
decision by the Circuit Court for Carroll
County was reversed.
The case revolved around a landlordtenant suit brought in the District Court
for Carroll County. In 1981, Josephine
Brunner and Salvatore Torres leased an
apartment at a housing project known as
Bishop's Garth. Three years later, Bishop's
Garth sought restitution of the premises
by bringing an action against Brunner and
Torres, claiming breach of their lease.
Through their counsel, the Legal Aid
Bureau, the tenants requested a jury trial.
The jury found in favor of the landlord.

When the defendants' appeal was dismissed for procedural reasons, Bishop's Garth
filed for and was granted attorney's fees
under Md. Rule 1-341.
In its opinion, the court of special
appeals drew particular attention to a
meeting between a Legal Aid attorney and
the managing general partner of Bishop's
Garth. The Legal Aid lawyer requested
photostats of other tenants' complaints
against Brunner and Torres, along with
pictures showing Brunner and Torres's
children damaging the housing project's
property. When denied this information,
the Legal Aid attorney allegedly
announced, "I'm sure you know that we
can stretch this thing out. ... Based on
that fact, don't you think it might be to
your advantage to come to some agreement with Mrs. Brunner and - save yourself some money?" Id. at 219, 540 A.2d at
fi77. In a footnote, the court referred to
The Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Conduct. They then commented
that there was no doubt that the lawyer's
"somewhat tactless remarks" inspired the
plaintiffs request for punitive measures
pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. Id. at 219, 540
A.2d at 1178.
Maryland Rule 1-341, which corresponds with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, declares
In any civil action, if the court finds
that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding
was in bad faith or without substantial
justification, the court may require the
offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay
to the adverse party the costs of the
proceeding and the reasonable
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.
Rule 1-341's "bad faith" requirement
encompasses the notion that before sanctions can be applied, one must act "for
purposes of delay." Blanton v. Equitable
Bank, 61 Md. App. 158, 163, 485 A.2d 694
(1985).
The court of special appeals was disturbed by the trial judge's finding that the
tenants' indulgence in a jury trial and
subsequent appeal was not in good faith
and bereft of substantial justification. The
trial judge expounded that the request for
a jury trial was motivated by a desire for
delay in order to unduly coerce Bishop's
Garth to dismiss the action. Md. Rule 1341, however, is inapplicable to justifiable
delays, especially if the behavior causing
the delay concerns the assertion of a fundamental right. Legal Aid, 540 A.2d at
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1178.
The appellate court referred to the Comment following Md. Rule 1-341 to help
identify whether the case was "frivolous."
According to the Comment, filing an
action, defense, or similar matter on a
client's behalf is not frivolous just because
the facts are not thoroughly supported or
because the attorney anticipates developing important evidence via discovery
alone. Furthermore, the lawyer need not
believe that his client's argument eventually will succeed. On the other hand, the
Comment asserts that an action is frivolous if the client's motivation behind pursuing the action is to harrass or
maliciously injure another. Additionally, a
frivolous action includes a situation in
which the lawyer cannot argue in good
faith on the merits of the case or he cannot
substantiate his case by arguing in good
faith that the law be extended, modified,
or reversed. Id at 221·22,540 A.2d at 1179.
Considering case law, with an eye on the
Comment, the court ruled that the trial
judge was clearly erroneous in finding that
the jury trial request was inappropriate.
Close attention was paid to the remark
in the trial judge's opinion that, "It became
clear during the trial that the defendant's
case was totally without merit." (emphasis
added by the court). The court of special
appeals responded, "We think it erroneous
to determine a lack of substantial justification from the vantage point of judicial
hindsight because hindsight, judicial or
otherwise, is always 20/20, irrespective of
any astigmatism foresight may suffer." Id
at 222, 540 A.2d at 1179. Instead, the appellate court found that the applicable test has
nothing to do with hindsight. Rather, it is
a matter of "whether the action or defense
to it was initiated in bad faith or without
substantial justification." Id Dent '0. Sim·
mons reinforced the Legal Aid court's
stance by expressing the view that the losing party should not suffer the imposition
of Rule 1-341 sanctions for introducing a
legal theory based on imagination or dilute
reasoning. Dent '0. Simmons, 61 Md. App.
122, 127-28,485 A.2d 270 (1985).
Dent molded the court's approach to a
situation in the case sub judice in which a
witness for the defense testified under oath
at trial that he resided in the apartment
rented by Brunner and Torres for at least
five weeks. This action flagrantly violated
the lease provision forbidding an individual unnamed on the lease to stay there in
excess of thirty days. This testimony contradicted not only answers to interrogatories that Brunner and Torres had filed,
but their lawyer's opening statement as
well. Nonetheless, the court refused to
apply Rule 1-341 sanctions to this situation

wherein a witness testified in an unanticipated manner. Remarking that it is the
jury's role to determine which witnesses to
believe, the court added, "the fact that the
jury may believe one witness instead of
others does not mean that the party whose
witnesses were not believed defended in
'bad faith' or 'without substantial justification. '" Legal Aid. 75 Md. App. at 223, 540
A.2d at 1179.
The court went on to emphasize that
trial counsel cannot assume the role of
fact-finder. Relying upon Insel '0. Solomon,
the court agreed that as a matter of law, a
substantial justification exists for an
action's defense as long as one reasonably
believes that a case creates a factual issue
for the fmder of fact. Insel '0. Solomon, 63
Md. App. 384, 398, 491 A.2d 963 (1985).
Thus, Legal Aid more clearly defines the
scope of Md. Rule 1-341. The court reiterates that the rule is not meant to prevent
individuals with causes supported by fragile or imaginative legal theories from having their day in court because they fear the
imposition of sanctions. Instead, "no one
who avails himself or herself of the right to
seek redress in a Maryland court of law
should be punished merely for exercising
that right." Legal Aid. 75 Md. App. at 224,
540 A.2d at 1180. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, therefore, limits the
judiciary's ability to award attorney's fees
by encouraging more circumscribed and
judicious utilization of Rule 1-341.

-Gregory R. Smouse
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